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Abstract 
It is time to rethink the history of narratology, a field of study that is undergoing a recontextualization and 
renaissance. Examining ways in which classical narrative theory was embedded in its cultural milieux, this 
paper reconsiders one chapter in the history of structuralist narrative analysis as it emerges in France in 
the 1960s. The paper focuses on the genesis—and the genealogy—of the concept of narrative "actants." 
Actants were originally construed as names for the basic and general roles that can be assumed by 
characters in the unfolding of a narrative. Structuralist theories owed much to Vladimir Propp's actantial 
typology, which included the villain, the donor, the helper, the sought-for-person and her father, the 
dispatcher, the hero, and the false hero. But existentialist theories of the self may also have inflected the 
way structuralist narratologists drew on linguistic theory to redescribe characters in stories as actants. 
Further, a more historically particularized account of actants may have significant methodological 
consequences for present-day analysts interested in using actantial models to study narrative. 
Keywords 
narratology, existentialism, classical narrative theory, structuralist narrative analysis, narrative actants, 
Vladamir Propp, actactial typology, existentialist theory, narrative study 
This article is available in Studies in 20th Century Literature: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol24/iss2/5 
Existentialist Roots of Narrative Actants 
David Herman 
North Carolina State University 
It seems that rumors of the death of narratology have been 
greatly exaggerated. Recently we have witnessed a small but un- 
mistakable explosion of activity in the field of narrative studies; 
signs of this minor narratological renaissance include the publi- 
cation of a spate of articles, special issues, and books that re- 
think and recontextualize classical models for narratological re- 
search;' the evident success of the journal Narrative (not founded 
until 1993); and the establishment of a book series devoted spe- 
cifically to "The Theory and Interpretation of Narrative" at the 
Ohio State University Press. Thus a full account of narratology- 
a complete story of our ongoing rapprochement with stories- 
remains yet to be written. By the same token, narratology's his- 
tory sometimes gets told in ways that flatten it out into a 
monolithically (if not monomaniacally) scientistic endeavor. 
Recounted too rapidly, the history of narratology can work to 
decontextualize a method of analysis that is itself sometimes 
charged with a lack of concern for context. In particular, it is 
important not to sever links between models for narrative analy- 
sis and surrounding critico-theoretical trends. 
Here, in order to indicate ways in which classical narrative 
theory was embedded in its cultural milieux, I should like to re- 
consider one chapter in the history of structuralist narrative 
analysis as it emerged in France in the 1960s. My concern is with 
the genesis-and the genealogy-of the concept of narrative 
"actants." In the narratological tradition, actants represent a new, 
linguistically informed approach to the very old problem of lit- 1
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erary character. Actants are typically defined as "fundamental 
role [s] at the level of narrative deep structure" (Prince 1). In other 
words, "actants are general categories [of behavior or doing] un- 
derlying all narratives (and not only narratives) while [actors] 
are invested with specific qualities in different narratives" 
(Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative 34).2 After investigating the lineage 
of this key narratological concept, I shall go on to examine some 
philosophical contexts for the actantial model that first appeared 
in its canonical form in 1966 in A. J. Greimas's Simantique 
structurale (Structural Semantics). Refined by Greimas in his 1973 
essay on "Actants, Actors, and Figures," the model was widely 
influential, adopted (and adapted) in much subsequent 
narratological work. My claim is that, in what amounts to a se- 
ries of disciplinary displacements, existentialist theories of the 
self may have inflected the way structuralist narratologists drew 
on linguistic theory to redescribe characters in stories as actants. 
Further, a more historically particularized account of actants may 
have significant methodological consequences for present-day 
analysts interested in using actantial models to study narrative. 
In a certain sense, structuralist narratology began with the 
attempt to create a systematic framework for describing how char- 
acters participate in the narrated action. In his Morphology of the 
Folktale-a text first published in 1928 and one of the works as- 
sociated with Russian Formalism that would exercise such a pro- 
found influence on Francophone narratology3-Vladimir Propp 
followed Aristotle in subordinating character to action or plot." 
Articulating a descriptive vocabulary based on the "functions" 
performed by characters in stories, Propp conceived of the func- 
tion as "an act of character, defined from the point of view of its 
significance for the course of the action" (21). A function is thus 
a participatory slot in the syntagmatic unfolding of a narrative, 
and "character" is a relatively loose (if traditional) way of talking 
about kinds of slots and the relational networks linking them 
together. Arguing that many seemingly diverse functions join 
together to create a few, typifiable "spheres of action," Propp de- 
veloped a typology of seven general roles (the villain, the donor, 
the helper, the sought-for-person and her father, the dispatcher, 
the hero, and the false hero) that correspond to the ways in which 2




characters can participate in the plot structures found in the genre 
of the folktale (79-80). 
Propp's subordination of characters to the action-his shift 
from personalities to participatory roles-provided the basis for 
structuralist accounts of actants. Rooted in contemporary lin- 
guistic theory, these accounts were also resolutely anti-psycho- 
logical, displacing attention from the interior states to the mani- 
fest deeds of participants in a story. The issue became not what 
characters are but what they do; a character is nothing more than 
the sequence of (plot-relevant) actions that it performs. To an- 
ticipate: from a broadly Proppian perspective, as in existentialist 
theories of the self, characters' motivations do not precede and 
explain their actions, but are rather born with the actions them- 
selves. "Interiority" or psychological essence is not a cause but 
an effect of the way characters (and people) behave; it is a hy- 
pothesis about behavior that can only be constructed ex post 
facto and at the risk of what Jean-Paul Sartre would call bad faith. 
To read characters in the traditional, familiar way-to construe 
them as psychological beings instead of emergent behavioral pro- 
files-is to live in narratological bad faith. 
Yet the structuralists made explicit appeal not to philosophi- 
cal but to linguistic paradigms in elaborating the insights they 
took over from Propp. Thus Greimas's Semantique structurale 
appeared in the same year that Roland Barthes recommended 
that "the structural analysis of narrative be given linguistics as 
founding model" ("Introduction" 82).5 Whereas Greimas (him- 
self a linguist) was the first to invoke the term actant in connec- 
tion with stories, he did not coin the word. Rather, in developing 
his actantial typology Greimas drew on the syntactic theories of 
Lucien Tesniere. In Elements de syntaxe structurale (1959), 
Tesniere had likened the sentence to "un petit drame" 'a small 
drama,' and written that: 
Comme un drame en effet, it comporte obligatoirement un 
proces, et le plus souvent des acteurs et des circonstances. 
Transposes du plan de la realite dramatique sur celui de la 
syntaxe structurale, le proces, les acteurs et les circonstances 
deviennent respectivement le verbe, les actants et les 
circonstants. Le verbe exprime le proces . . . . Les actants sont 3
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les titres ou les choses qui, A un titre quelconque et de quelque 
facon que ce soit, meme au titre de simples figurants et de la 
facon la plus passive, participent au proces .... Les actants sont 
toujours des substantifs ou des equivalents de substantifs. 
Inversement les substantifs assument en principe toujours dans 
la phrase la fonction d'actants. (106; propositions 1-6)6 
Like a drama, it [the sentence or "nceud verbal" 'verbal node'] 
comprises necessarily an action and most often actors and cir- 
cumstances as well. Transposed from the plane of dramatic re- 
ality to that of structural syntax, the action, actors and circum- 
stances become, respectively, the verb, the actants and the 
circumstants. The verb expresses the action. . . . The actants 
are beings or things that participate in the action-in whatever 
capacity and whatever style this might entail, even if it is as mere 
walk-ons and in the most passive way imaginable. Actants are 
always nouns or the equivalents of nouns. Inversely, in a given 
phrase nouns always assume, at least in principle, the function 
of actants. 
Synthesizing Propp's and Tesniere's ideas, Greimas reframed and 
radicalized one of the theoretical postulates informing Morphol- 
ogy of the Folktale: namely, the assumption that if characters are 
to be described in a systematic as opposed to an ad hoc way, they 
should be viewed not as clusters of qualities or traits, but rather 
as variables in a kind of behavioral calculus, or alternatively units 
in a grammar of action, a syntax of doing.' Adopting the 
Barthesian view that "a narrative is a long sentence, just as every 
constative sentence is ... the rough outline of a short narrative" 
("Introduction" 84), Greimas drew on Tesniere's work to inter- 
pret actants as syntactic elements that are distributed in narra- 
tive "sentences" in patterned, predictable ways.' Thus, whereas 
actors are semantic units, actants are syntactic ones, such that 
"An actor functions as an actant only when it is put into play by 
either narrative syntax or linguistic syntax" (Greimas, "Actants" 
114). Further, actantial roles, like syntactic units, are theoretical 
constructs pertaining to all narratives; they are part of the very 
grammar of stories. By contrast, actors are the equivalent of par- 
ticular sentences realized within the grammar of a language; the 
output of grammatical rules and operations located in the deep 
structure of narrative, actors are surface structures specific to 4




particular stories (Greimas, Structural 197-201, 211 -13).9 At stake, 
then, is the difference between examining the structure and the 
content of a given sentence, its actantial scaffolding in contrast 
to how it is used to characterize this or that actor. "Opponent" is 
an abstract grammatical category that can be used to generate 
structural descriptions of narrative sentences as diverse as those 
used to tell the stories of Claudius in Hamlet, the Devil in The 
Brothers Karamazov, and Leonce Pontellier in The Awakening. For 
the same reason an actor can embody more than one actantial 
role (a character can be both opponent and helper over the course 
of a story), and conversely an actantial role can be embodied by 
more than one actor (several different characters can be helpers 
in a narrative) (Greimas, "Actants" 106-07, 111-13; Coste 134- 
37; Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative 35). 
Subsequent narratological investigations of the problem of 
character bear the impress of Greimas's model-in particular, 
its reframing of Propp's ideas in linguistic (and more specifically 
syntactic) terms. In his 1969 Grammaire du "Decameron," where 
the term "narratologie" `narratology' was first proposed, even as 
Tzvetan Todorov rejects Greimas's actantial typology he retains 
a grammatico-syntactic approach to characters. For Todorov, "the 
grammatical subject is always without internal properties; these 
can only come from its momentary conjunction with a predi- 
cate."10 What we call characters are the product of a quasi-syn- 
tactical operation-a reading procedure essential for story com- 
prehension-by virtue of which predicates are attached to proper 
names to yield narrative agents (Todorov, Grammaire 19ff.; cf. 
Chatman 125-31; Herman, Universal 89-90). Narratological 
analysis of characters should therefore work to discover the 
combinatory system, the narrative langue, in terms of which sub- 
jects are assigned predicates by the reader: 
[In a narrative] certain characters are placed in opposition to 
others. Yet an immediate opposition of the characters would 
simplify these relations without coming any closer to our goal. 
It would serve our purpose better to decompose each image into 
distinctive features and to put these in a relation of opposition 
or identity with the distinctive features of other characters in 
the same narrative. We would thereby obtain a reduced num- 5
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ber of axes of opposition whose various combinations would 
regroup these features into representative clusters of charac- 
ters. (Todorov, "Heritage" 253) 
Todorov thus follows the Propp-Tesniere-Greimas tradition in 
viewing characters as the narrative equivalent of grammatical 
subjects; in the same tradition he subsumes narrative participants 
under a combinatory logic that regulates their functions vis -a- 
vis the plot. Yet it is Barthes who, in his "Introduction to the 
Structural Analysis of Narratives," offers the most searching dis- 
cussion of the actantial model, its conceptual bases, and its philo- 
sophical and ideological ramifications. Couched in language that 
is reminiscent of existentialism, Barthes's account suggests why 
Francophone structuralists may have been especially receptive 
to Propp's action-centered approach in the first place. It also sug- 
gests why the narratologists made character primarily a problem 
of narrative syntax (how do we determine the units out of which 
stories are composed and formulate their principles of composi- 
tion?) and not narrative semantics (how best do we describe sto- 
ries' propositional content and/or their referential properties?) 
or narrative pragmatics (what sorts of world-knowledge do read- 
ers bring to stories and how does such contextual information 
get paired with narrative form to yield nonrandom, predictable 
inferences about the meaning of stories?). 
In his "Introduction" Barthes remarks that, whereas in Aris- 
totelian poetics "the notion of character is secondary, entirely 
subsidiary to the notion of action": 
Later the character, who until then had been only a name, the 
agent of an action, acquired a psychological consistency, be- 
came an individual, a "person," in short a fully constituted "be- 
ing," even should he do nothing and of course even before act- 
ing. Characters stopped being subordinate to the action, em- 
bodied immediately psychological essences; which essences 
could be drawn up into lists, as can be seen in its purest form in 
the list of "character parts" in bourgeois theatre. . . . From its 
very outset, structural analysis has shown the utmost reluctance 
to treat character as an essence, even merely for purposes of 
classification. . . . Structural analysis, much concerned not to 
define characters in terms of psychological essences, has so far 6




striven, using various hypotheses, to define a character not as a 
"being" but as a "participant." (104-06) 
This passage does have the ring of a structuralist manifesto. It is 
in part the programmatic statement of a method of inquiry that 
focuses not on timeless and enduring meanings but on the 
semiotic and cultural codes that constitute objects, situations, 
and events as meaningful to those who interpret them. The same 
codes, of course, underwrite human as well as literary identities; 
there is no bedrock or essence of the self but rather signifying 
practices that traverse the individual and make it readable as a 
self. But that is only part of the story. Barthes's formulations can 
also be compared with some of the tenets of existentialism pre- 
sented by Sartre an essay written in 1946, "L'existentialisme est 
un humanisme" ("Existentialism is a humanism")-originally 
intended to be a precis of the major ideas of Sartre's L'etre et le 
neant (Being and Nothingness) (1943). Here Sartre wishes to dis- 
pute the kind of humanism associated with philosophers such as 
Diderot, Voltaire, and Kant. According to this earlier version of 
humanism, "Man has a human nature; this human nature, which 
is the concept of the human, is found in all men, which means 
that each man is a particular example of a universal concept, man. 
... Thus . .. the essence of man precedes the historical existence 
that we find in nature" (35). By contrast, in the atheistic existen- 
tialism championed by Sartre, 
there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, 
a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, and 
... this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, human reality. What 
is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means 
that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, 
only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist 
conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. 
Only afterwards will he be something, and he himself will have 
made what he will be. (Sartre 35-36)" 
For Sartre, the slogan "existence precedes essence" adum- 
brates important ethical as well as metaphysical propositions. It 
suggests that "there is no explaining things away by reference to 
a fixed and given human nature"; and because "there is no deter- 7
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minism, man is free, man is freedom." Thus humanity, "with no 
support and no aid, is condemned every moment to invent [hu- 
manity]" (Sartre 41). In response to critics who charge the phi- 
losophy with exempting people from responsibility for their ac- 
tions, the existentialist says: "There is no reality except in action." 
Even more tellingly, Sartre paraphrases existentialist doctrine as 
follows: 
Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent 
that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the en- 
semble of his acts, nothing else than his life.. .. What we mean 
is that a man is nothing else than a series of undertakings, that 
he is the sum, the organization, the ensemble of the relation- 
ships which make up these undertakings. (47; 48) 
Mutatis mutandis-with the philosopher focusing on human 
selves, the narratologist on narrative identities-Sartre and 
Barthes offer strikingly similar accounts. Both writers define iden- 
tity as an ensemble of actions; both suggest that no psychologi- 
cal or moral essence precedes the acts (and choices to act) that 
make one become what one is. Indeed, the distinctly Sartrean 
overtones of Barthes's "Introduction" suggest the existential roots 
of narrative actants. Read against Sartrean philosophy, Barthes's 
account helps contextualize the two-stage process by which the 
structuralists combined Propp's and Tesniere's ideas to bring the 
"actant under the . . . categories of the grammatical (and not 
psychological) person" (Barthes 109). In a first stage, Propp's 
subordination of character to action paralleled-and offered in- 
dependent confirmation of-the existentialist subordination of 
essence to existence, timeless "human nature" to the acts by which 
people create their own contingent identities. To this extent, the 
narratologists' redescription of characters as participants rather 
than beings was historically overdetermined; as research strate- 
gies, actantial models are of a jointly Proppian and Sartrean prov- 
enance. In a second, more explicitly grammatical stage of research 
on actants, Greimas chose Tesniere's syntactic model as a for- 
malism for character analysis-a systematic notation for docu- 
menting story participants not as essences with a meaning but as 
sets of actions combined to create larger narrative structures. 8




Again, this "choice"-a confluence of ideas and methods that of 
course transcends Greimas as an individual-was 
overdetermined. It is true that, in hindsight, "Propp's analyses 
approach the object from a syntactic perspective; each folk nar- 
rative belonging to the corpus is shown to manifest the same 
abstract structure, independently of the particular motifs in the 
story"-just as "syntax discovers combinatory patterns of abstract 
categories ... independently of the lexical units which may form 
the actual sentence" (Pavel 87). Sartrean and more broadly exis- 
tentialist theories of the self, however, may have made theorists 
like Greimas especially predisposed to fusing Propp's scheme with 
syntactic models. Emptied of content or essence, the Sartrean 
self figures as a concatenation of acts and relationships to other, 
similarly content-less actors. Likewise, viewed from a syntactic 
perspective, narrative actants appear not as centers of meaning 
and value-not as a part of the semantics of story-but as place- 
holders in the structure of the ongoing action. 
The existentialist bases of narrative actants may compel us 
to rethink the future as well as the history of narratology. His- 
torically, the existentialist influence might help account for the 
preeminence of certain kinds of grammatical models in the hey- 
day of structuralist narratology. Rimmon-Kenan points to "meth- 
odological considerations" as the primary reason for the graft- 
ing of Propp's ideas onto Francophone structuralism, and in 
particular Propp's subordination of character to action: 
Like any scientifically oriented discipline, formalist and struc- 
turalist poetics recognizes the methodological necessity of re- 
duction, especially in preliminary phases of an inquiry. Since 
action seems more easily amenable to the construction of "nar- 
rative grammars" (often based on verb-centred grammars of 
natural languages), it is convenient to reduce character to ac- 
tion. (34) 
The more or less overt scientism of the structuralists, however, 
does not suffice to explain their reduction of character to action. 
The methodological imperative Rimmon-Kenan describes was 
itself part of a larger complex of cultural and intellectual forces. 
In the case of actantial models, the really interesting question is 9
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why certain methodologies borrowed from the field of linguis- 
tics-e.g., those associated with syntactic analysis -tool hold 
while others did not. In a different milieu, very different research 
hypotheses about actants might have suggested themselves. In- 
deed, a better understanding of narratology's past can help today's 
researchers envision new possibilities for narrative analysis. 
Whereas the structuralists for the most part drew on syntactic 
theory to develop their actantial typologies, more recent research 
has indicated the relevance of pragmatic and cognitive models 
for studying actants." Thus Monika Fludernik has outlined an 
enriched narratology according to which readers "naturalize" sto- 
ries-bring them within the domain of the natural or compre- 
hensible-in order to interpret them as narratives in the first 
place. In order to naturalize stories, readers typically use "frames" 
or pre-stored sets of expectations, and for Fludernik expectations 
about action or behavior constitute one of the most basic frames 
in terms of which people make sense out of narratives (Towards 
44-52)." On this model, actants are not syntactic units built into 
narrative structure, but rather cognitive paradigms used to im- 
pute goal-directed behavior to narrative agents. After all, a story 
is not just an assemblage of discrete events; to be processed as a 
narrative, event-strings must also involve a specific configura- 
tion of participants or actants whose doings conform to known 
behavioral paradigms. Cognitively based inferences about actants 
thus allow story recipients to recognize certain modes of discourse 
as being narratively organized in the first place. More generally, 
though narrative actants may have had existentialist roots, and 
though those beginnings may have prompted narratologists to 
study characters in reductively syntactic terms at first, the con- 
cept of actants is in no way exhausted by the history of its uses. 
Notes 
1. For example, in 1990, Poetics Today published two issues entitled 
"Narratology Revisited." A few of the relevant articles and books are: 
Monika Fludernik's "Narratology" and Towards; David Herman's "Hy- 10




pothetical"; Susan S. Lanser's Fictions; and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan's 
"How." 
2. Greimas likewise posits a distinction "between actants, having to do 
with narrative syntax, and actors, which are recognizable in the par- 
ticular discourses in which they are manifested" ("Actants" 106). 
3. To get a sense of just how influential Propp's text was, see for ex- 
ample Claude Bremond's Logique and Todorov's "Transformations" and 
"Heritage." 
4. Cf. Roland Barthes, "Introduction" (104); Rimmon-Kenan, Narra- 
tive (34); and Aristotle, Poetics, Section VI, p. 52. 
5. In "To Write: An Intransitive Verb?"-an essay written around the 
same time-Barthes makes similar claims about the singular impor- 
tance of linguistic models for literary analysis. 
6. Greimas invokes Tesniere's theatrical metaphor at the beginning of 
chapter 10 of Structural Semantics (197-221). 
7. In "Actants," Greimas suggested that, in principle, a theory of charac- 
ter must include not just a typology of actantial roles but also an ac- 
count of how actants manifest themselves in the "discoursive structures" 
of stories-structures built up through "relational figurative network[s] 
that can be strung out over entire sequences" as well as through indi- 
vidual narrative utterances (115; 113-19). In fact, however, the lack of a 
"coherent discourse theory" has impeded the development of a system- 
atic model of "actorial organization" that would complement the 
actantial model. 
8. Culler, too, points out that "One function of [Greimas's] scheme is to 
make the structure of the sentence roughly homologous to the 'plot' of 
a text" (82). 
9. See Greimas, Structural (197-201, 211-13). 
10. Quoted and translated by Culler (235). 
11. Compare the similar account offered in 1887 by Friedrich Nietzsche: 
".. . just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and 
takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called light- 
ning, so popular morality also separates strength from the expression 
of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, 
which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such 
substratum; there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the 11
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doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed-the deed is everything. The 
popular mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, 
it is the deed of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a 
second time as its effect" (First Essay, Section 13, p. 481). 
12. Already in 1973, however, Greimas had pointed to important prag- 
matic dimensions of the concept of actants, arguing that actantial mod- 
els "constitute an attempt to account for instances and trajectories of 
meaning that generate discourse. But their importance is also pragmatic. 
They have to be considered as models of predictability, as hypotheses 
presented in the form of logical articulations that, once projected onto 
texts, can enhance their readability" ("Actants" 113). 
13. For related arguments, see Herman, "Socionarratology." 
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